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Abstract
This paper discusses a model of vertical and horizontal product differenti-
ation within the Dixit-Stiglitz framework of monopolistic competition. Firms
do not only compete in prices and horizontal attributes of their products, but
also in the quality that can be controlled by R&D activities. Based upon the
results of a general equilibrium model, intra-sectoral trade and the welfare im-
plications of public intervention in terms of research promotion are considered.
The analysis is completed by a numerical application to ten basic European
industries.
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1 Introduction
The theoretical concept of monopolistic competition enjoys a great popularity since
the seminal work of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) – the beginning of the second monopo-
listic revolution, as it is referred to by Brakman and Heijdra (2004). Nowadays, this
idea has penetrated different fields of research, not only Microeconomics, but also
Endogenous Growth Theory or New Trade Theory. An essential attribute in models
of monopolistic competition is product differentiation. Following the classification
of Sutton (1991), Schmalensee (1992) distinguishes Type 1 and Type 2 industries.
While a Type 1 is characterized by horizontally differentiated (or homogenous) prod-
ucts, Type 2 firms do not only compete in prices and horizontal product attributes,
but also in (perceived) quality, what is described as vertical differentiation. In this
context, quality is influenced by R&D (or advertising) expenditures, so that a firm
may increase its market share by increasing the quality of its product.
Beyond the oligopolistic market structures and the game-theoretical perspective of
this field of Industrial Organization, this paper aims to establish a basic model of ver-
tical product differentiation for a further implementation into international trade.
The main assumptions underlying this paper are referenced to the so-called New
Economic Geography (NEG) that, initially introduced by Krugman (1991), aims to
explain industrial agglomeration using the framework of monopolistic competition
à la Dixit Stiglitz. The model here incorporates explicitly R&D activities, beyond
the "anonymous" consideration within fixed factor, usually exercised in the NEG
literature.1
Furthermore, we include endogenous quality in the seminal model of Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) and analyze both, vertical as well as horizontal product differentia-
tion. In order to consider the impact of R&D from a macroeconomic point of view,
we design a general equilibrium model, where households offer (unskilled) labor and
research personnel. Detached from an analysis of particular product markets, with
the focus on the mechanisms in aggregates, we choose monopolistic competition,
rather than oligopolistic market structures, that are fairly discussed in the litera-
ture of Industrial Organization. What is new in this paper is the possibility to model
an explicit R&D sector and the analysis of economic policy instruments in terms
of research promotion. Finally, we analyze the allocation outcome in presence of
vertical linkages by introducing a simple input-output relationship between firms in
the manufacturing sector.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we build up the basic model with
one manufacturing industry. After a partial analysis, we extend the model by en-
1See for instance the Footloose Entrepreneur Model of Ottaviano (1996) and Forslid (1999),
where the fixed factor, named as human capital, is inter-regionally mobile.
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dogenous wages and income, as well as a separate research sector. In section 3,
we introduce intermediate trade within the manufacturing sector and consider the
comparative statics of market concentration and quality with respect to fixed costs.
Section 4 discusses three policy instruments and their implications for social welfare:
i) minimum quality standards; ii) the control of research costs; and iii) the optimal
supply in the market for R&D services. A numerical application of the model to real
economic data follows in section 5: For ten European basic industries we compute
quality, marginal research costs, and research elasticities. Finally, the paper closes
with a concluding discussions of the main findings and an outlook on future work
in section 6 .
2 The Model
Private Demand
Private households consume two types of goods: i) a homogenous good A produced
by a Walrasian, constant return sector (often referred to as agricultural sector), and
ii) differentiated industrial products provided by a manufacturing sector.2 Consumer
preferences follow a nested utility function of the form:
U =MµA1−µ,(1)
where M denotes a concave subutility from the consumption of the continuum of n
(potential) industrial goods:
M =
[
n∑
i=1
(ui)
1/σ (xi)
(σ−1)/σ
] σ
σ−1
, σ > 1 , ui > 0.(2)
While xi is the quantity consumed of variety i, ui denotes a product specific utility
parameter, henceforth denominated as product quality, σ is the constant substitution
elasticity between varieties.3 Applying Two-Stage Budgeting, we obtain the demand
function for a representative industrial product sort:
xD = µY up−σP σ−1,(3)
2Henceforth, the traditional sector is treated as the numeraire.
3The functional form of the subutility is based upon the numerical example of Sutton (1991),
p. 48 et sqq..
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where µY represents the share in household income for industrial products, p the
market price, and P is the price index and defined to be:
P =
[
n∑
i=1
ui (pi)
1−σ
] 1
1−σ
.(4)
As it is easy to reproduce, the demand elasticity in terms of quantity is constant at
σ, and with respect to quality 1. Interestingly, the price index contains information
about the product qualities. This results from its property as being the minimum
cost for a given subutility M . The higher the quality at constant prices, the lower
are consumer costs for reaching a certain level of satisfaction. The demand is in-
creasing (linearly) with respect to a rising product quality, what results from the
constant substitution elasticity. Assuming a representative variety, substitution of
(4) in (3) reveals a demand that depends upon market size, price and firm number
only, but that is independent from product quality.
Industrial Supply
Turning to the supply side of this model, the production of a particular variety re-
quires labor as the only input. The corresponding factor requirement is characterized
by a fixed and variable cost:
lM = F + ax,(5)
where M is mnemonic for manufacturing. Because of economies of scale and con-
sumer preference for diversity, it is profitable for firms to produce each only one
differentiated variety, so that firm number is equal to the number of available prod-
uct sorts. Beside production, firms have capacity for undertaking research activities.
Following Sutton (1991), firms can control their product quality by research invest-
ments. Compared to the original Dixit-Stiglitz model, producers have an additional
degree of freedom in building up a monopolistic scope beside horizontal product dif-
ferentiation. Attaining and maintaining a certain level of quality requires research
expenditures as given in equation (6).
R (u) =
r
γ
uγ , γ > 1.(6)
The parameter, r, represents a constant cost rate and γ the research elasticity.
The research expenditure function shows a deterministic relation. Furthermore,
it is convex what implies that increasing product quality requires more and more
investments. After all, research is essential – otherwise, the product quality and
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simultaneously demand become zero.4 The profit function of a manufacturing firms
is given by:
pi = px−R− wF − wax,(7)
where w denotes the exogenous wage rate. From profit maximization follows the
price setting rule:
p∗ =
(
σ
σ − 1
)
aw,(8)
where the term in brackets is the monopolistic price mark-up, atop the marginal
production cost. Normalizing the variable production coefficient, a, by (σ − 1)/σ,
the profit maximizing price becomes w.5
The optimum research policy can be derived from the first derivative of the profit
function with respect to quality:
µY up−σP σ−1 (p− wa) = ruγ.(9)
The term on the right hand side of (9) represents the marginal research cost of
increasing product quality, what can also be expressed as γR. The left hand side
shows the increase of the operating profit (profit less research costs), in response to
a change in quality. From (9) follows the optimum quality of a particular firm:
u∗ =
(
µY w1−σP σ−1
σr
) 1
γ−1
.(10)
The choice of quality depends upon two factors: the research cost, and the degree
of competition. The higher the cost rate, r, the lower is the product quality due
to the optimum rule in (9). A decreasing competitive pressure, through an increase
of market size, a lower substitution elasticity, or a higher profit maximizing price,
makes firms compete in quality rather than prices. In other words, firms expand
their research activities with a decreasing degree of competition. The behavior of
the other firms, in terms of firm number and quality, effects the demand via the
price index. An increase in firm number or competitive quality reduces the price
index and, thus, the demand of the particular firm. Finally, the firm is not in funds
4Sutton (1991) assumes a minimum product quality of 1 that is guaranteed even if no research
is undertaken. For analytical convenience, we simplify this proposition.
5See Fujita et al. (1999), p.54 et sq..
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to finance research expenditure, what can be seen by substituting the price index
into (10):
u∗ =
(
µY
σrn
) 1
γ
.(11)
Equation (11) provides a central information: the interdependency between market
concentration (measured in the number of firms) and the product quality. The
corresponding research expenditures respond positively to market concentration:
R∗ =
µY
σγn
.(12)
Long Run Equilibrium
The long run equilibrium is characterized by free market entry and exit and thus,
a variable firm number. From the zero profit condition, we obtain the equilibrium
output of each firm:
x∗ =
µY
γwn
+ σF.(13)
Compared to the original Dixit-Stiglitz outcome, the equilibrium output does not
only depend upon exogenous parameters, but also upon the research expenditure.
Therefore, the firm size is determined by fixed cost of production, as well as by
research expenditure and market size, respectively. From (13), we can derive the
equilibrium labor input:
(
lM
)∗
= F + ax∗ = σF +
(
σ − 1
σ
)
µY
γwn
.(14)
Because of the partial-analytic attribute of this model, the labor market is in equi-
librium at the wage rate, w, so that labor supply is equal to the labor requirement
of firms: LM = nlM . From this identity, the firm number can be derived using
equation (14):6
n∗ =
LM
lM
=
1
σF
[
LM −
(
σ − 1
σ
)
µY
γw
]
.(15)
General Equilibrium
6From (15) follows the non-negativity condition: LM >
(
σ−1
σ
)
µY
γw .
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For considering the model from macroeconomic point of view, we adopt a simple gen-
eral equilibrium framework. To internalize wages and income, we need to introduce
a separate R&D sector receiving the corresponding expenditures of the manufac-
turing industry. We assume a linear, constant return technology, where one unit
R&D requires one unit of scientific input, research staff for instance.7 The tradi-
tional sector uses (unskilled) labor as an input within a linear technology, where one
unit labor generates one unit output, again. Because the homogenous good is the
numeraire, the corresponding price is set to 1.
The GDP of the economy consists of the labor income, the agricultural revenues, as
well as the earnings of the R&D sector:
Y = wLM + LA + nR.(16)
Following Fujita et al. (1999), we normalize the manufacturing workforce LM with λ,
and LA, the agricultural workforce, with 1−λ, so that the total supply of unqualified
labor is given by: L = LM + LA. Hence, the income becomes: Y = w + nR. We
assume an inelastic labor supply so that wages come from the so-called wage equation
that determines the wage at which firms break even:
xS = µY up−σP σ−1.(17)
This equality provides two essential conditions: the instant and simultaneous clear-
ing of the factor market as well as of the product market. We solve this expression
for the price and wage, respectively:
w∗ =
(
µY uP σ−1
x∗
) 1
σ
.(18)
We allow intersectoral labor allocation, so that the equilibrium wage rate is equal to
1. Turning to the R&D sector, the cost rate, r, results from the market equilibrium
of research services: rLR = nR. Using equation (12) and setting the total supply of
R&D services, LR, equal to 1, the research cost rate is given by:
r =
µY
σγ
.(19)
Equation (19) implies several important results: i) the cost rate increases with an
increasing market size and decreasing homogeneity of downstream products; ii) it
7In fact, instead of considering an autonomous sector, it may be possible to regard R&D as an
in-house process of the manufacturing industry that is staffed from a particular labor market.
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decreases with a rising research elasticity. The first comes from from the firm’s
quality policy, where the research expenditure rise with a lower degree of competi-
tion. The second is the implicit argument of the marginal research cost. Finally,
the income can be expressed as:
Y =
σγ
σγ − µ.(20)
Substituting this expression, in combination with the price index as well as the
equilibrium output (13), into the wage equation (18), and solving for n, we obtain
for the firm number:
n∗ =
µ
F
(
γ − 1
σγ − µ
)
.(21)
Using this expression, the equilibrium firm size is given by:
x∗ = σF
(
γ
γ − 1
)
.(22)
For the equilibrium rate of research services, we obtain:
r∗ =
µ
σγ − µ,(23)
so that product quality and research expenditures become:
u∗ =
[
F
µ
(
γ (σγ − µ)
γ − 1
)] 1
γ
(24)
R∗ =
F
γ − 1 .(25)
From (22) one can see, that firm size depends upon exogenous parameters, but is
times the term in brackets higher than the firm size of the original Dixit-Stiglitz
model. In addition, the higher γ, what implies the more expensive is a quality
improvement, the lower the firm size as a result of a higher price competition, and
the lower the quality. The relation between quality and market concentration is
described by:
u =
(γ
n
) 1
γ
.(26)
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The lower the firm number the higher are research expenditures and product quality.
The reason is straightforward: a decreasing firm number increases demand and
profits due to the price index. Because research is financed by sales revenues, the
capacity for R&D investments expands, what, in consequence, increases product
quality. The opposite relation can be derived from the market clearing condition
npx = µY . The firm number with respect to quality is given by:
n =
µγ (γ − 1) (σγ − µ)
γ2σF (σγ − µ)− µ2 (γ − 1)uγ .(27)
The firm number increases in product quality, what can be traced back to the simple
market size argument: the higher the quality the higher R&D expenditures and thus
the corresponding household income, what increases the market size and makes new
firms enter.8 The overall mechanism between quality and firm number complies with
the results of Sutton (1998), where an increasing market concentration goes along
with a high R&D intensity:
R
px
=
µ (γ − 1)
σFγ (σγ − µ)n =
1
σγ
.(28)
As apparent in equation (28), the R&D intensity is negatively correlated to the firm
number. In the equilibrium, it is dependent upon the substitution and research
elasticity only, what implies that the R&D intensity declines with an increasing ho-
mogeneity of products and increasing research effort.
Stability of Equilibrium
We assume free market entry and exit in response to firm profits, following the ad-
justment process: n˙ = f (pi) , f(0) = 0, f ′ > 0.9. We consider the case, where an ad-
ditional firm decides to enter the market. In consequence, the price index decreases,
what reduces the demand for a particular variety. Without quality improvement,
firms make losses at constant output, what leads to market exits, finally. But be-
cause firms have the capacity to improve quality by research investments, they may
counteract this development. As we have seen above, a higher firm number reduces
the financial resources for research and development via price index. Hence, the
product quality as well as demand and profits decrease. This leads to firm exits and
8Function (28) has a pole at u =
[
γ2σF (σγ−µ)
µ2(γ−1)
]1/γ
, that is always below the equilibrium value
(24).
9See Neary (2001).
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a return to the former equilibrium again. This mechanism can be shown by totally
differentiating the profit function with respect to price, quantity and quality:10
dpi =
p
σ
dx+
[
µ (γ − 1)
σγ − µ u
γ−1
]
du
u
.(29)
Firm profits respond to changes in demand and quality only, while they are not
affected by prices due to the price setting rule. An increase of demand gives always
rise to profits and, thus, market entry of new firms. The same applies for a qual-
ity improvement. The dependency becomes transparent by expressing the profit
function subject to quality only:
pi =
(
γ − 1
γ
)
ruγ − wF.(30)
The upper diagram in Figure 1 shows the profit function (30) with parameter settings
γ = 2, r = 1, F = 1, and µ = 0.2, σ = 2, for the lower diagram, respectively.
According to the total differential (29), an increase in product quality out of the
equilibrium makes profits increase due to rising demand, what leads to market entries
of new firms. As given by equation (26), a decreasing market concentration is
accompanied by lower R&D investments what reduces the product quality, until the
equilibrium is reached again.
3 Vertical Linkages
In this section, we extend the model by a simple input-output-structure, where the
manufacturing industry uses differentiated intermediate products from an imperfect
upstream sector, in accordance to Ethier (1982). Instead of considering two sep-
arated sectors, we aggregate them to one manufacturing industry, as practised by
Krugman and Venables (1995). By this approach, vertical linkages become horizon-
tal, inter-sectoral allocation intra-sectoral. Main implications are: i) the industry
uses a fixed proportion of its output as input again; ii) the technical substitution
elasticity for intermediates is identical to σ; iii) firms have the same quality prefer-
ences as consumers; and iv) the price index for intermediates is the same as for final
products. The corresponding production function is:
F + ax = Zl1−αIα , I =
[
n∑
i=1
(ui)
1/σ (xi)
(σ−1)/σ
] σ
σ−1
,(31)
10See Appendix.
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Figure 1: Quality and Firm Number
where Z represents a level parameter, that is normalized by (1− α)α−1 α−α, and I
an input composite of a continuum of (potential) differentiated products. From two-
stage budgeting, we obtain the cost function that is the analogue of the expenditure
function of consumers:
C = (F + ax)w1−αPα +R.(32)
The intermediate demand function is:
xu = α (C −R)up−σP σ−1,(33)
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where u denotes upstream. The total demand for a particular variety is composed
of consumer and intermediate demand, xd and xu:
xD = xd + xu = up−σP σ−1 [µY + nα (C −R)] ,(34)
where the term in square brackets represents the total expenditures, E, for industrial
products. Equation (34) reflects the so-called forward and backward linkages be-
tween firms. The more firms produce in the economy the higher is the intermediate
demand what increases firm number. Contrariwise, the more firms, the lower the
price index, what implies a decrease of procurement costs for intermediates on one
hand, and an increase of competition on the other hand. The relation interaction of
these two forces is crucial for the model dynamics in this section.
From profit maximization, we obtain the same price setting rule as in the previous
section:
p∗ = w1−αPα,(35)
where the term on the right hand side describes marginal cost as a composite of
wage rate and intermediate prices. The optimum product quality is given by:
u∗ =
(
xDw1−αPα
σr
) 1
γ
.(36)
The associated research investments are:
R∗ =
xDw1−αPα
γσ
.(37)
Using this expression, the equilibrium firm size results from the zero-profit-condition:
x∗ = σF
(
γ
γ − 1
)
,(38)
what is the same as in the model without vertical linkages. Turning to the labor
market, the equilibrium wage rate follows from the wage equation, again:
(
w1−αPα
)σ
=
uP σ−1E
x
.(39)
Due to inter-sectoral labor mobility, the wage rate is 1, again. In the research market,
the equilibrium price for R&D services can be expressed with equations (37) and
(38) as:
r =
(
1
γ − 1
)
nFP α.(40)
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A noteworthy result is that the optimum quality (36) becomes with (38) and (40)
the simple relationship between firm number and quality, as we have seen in the
previous section at (26). For the determination of the equilibrium firm number,
we bear in mind that the total expenditures on manufactures are the same as the
aggregate turnover of the industry: E = npx. Using equations (32)-(40), the firm
number with respect to quality is:
n∗ =
[
µ (γ − 1)
F (σγ (1− α) + α− µ)
] (1−σ)(1−α)
(1−σ)(1−α)+α
u
α
(σ−1)(1−α)−α(41)
The firm number is unique, positive, if the the denominator of the term in square
brackets fulfills the following condition:
σγ >
µ− α
1− α ,(42)
that is always valid. Having a closer look on equation (41), it is apparent that the
impact of quality on market concentration depends upon the denominator of the
corresponding exponent:
∂n
∂u
≷ 0 ⇒ 1 ≷
(
1
σ − 1
)(
α
1− α
)
(43)
The direction of change in the firm number with respect to a change in quality is not
positive definite, as it is in the previous section, characterized in equation (28). In
fact, the correlation depends upon the strength of two competing forces. An increas-
ing quality raises R&D investments and simultaneously consumer and intermediate
demand. The increasing quality reduces the price index, what dampens the demand
reduction, but increases the prices again, via the monopolistic price setting rule.
The overall effect implies a net reduction of demand. In contrast, the increasing
quality means higher research expenditures, what implies a smaller budget for inter-
mediates. Actually, the production cost C − R can be expressed as: FPα
(
γσ−1
γ−1
)
.
As apparent, a decreasing price index causes lower production cost, what decreases
the intermediate demand due to the constant cost share α. All in all, the direction
of change depends upon the strength of the forward linkage and the direct demand
effect.
Turning to the second central variable, the equilibrium product quality can be de-
rived from (37), (39), and (41), what leads to equation (26), again. This result, in
conjunction with the total differential of the profit function (see Appendix), ensures
a unique, globally stable equilibrium at:
u∗ = γ
α
γ(1−σ)(1−α)+γα−α
[
µ (γ − 1)
γF (σγ (1− α) + α− µ)
] (1−σ)(1−α)
α−γ(1−σ)(1−α)−γα+α
(44a)
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n∗ = γ
α−γ(1−σ)(1−α)
α−γ(1−σ)(1−α)−γα+α
[
µ (γ − 1)
γF (σγ (1− α) + α− µ)
] γ(σ−1)(1−α)
γ(σ−1)(1−α)−α(γ−1)
.(44b)
At this point, we may have a closer look on the effects of changes in the fixed
(production) cost, F , on market concentration and quality. On condition of (42),
the direction of change depends upon the exponents of the terms in brackets:
∂u
∂F
≶ 0 ⇒
(
γ
γ − 1
)
≶
(
1
σ − 1
)(
α
1− α
)
(45a)
∂n
∂F
≷ 0 ⇒
(
γ
γ − 1
)
≶
(
1
σ − 1
)(
α
1− α
)
.(45b)
This result differs from the single sector model, where the equilibrium market con-
centration is positively correlated with fixed cost. The reason is straightforward.
An increase of fixed cost leads to a decrease of profits and to an accompanying mar-
ket exit of firms. With vertical linkages, an increase of F , implying a rising factor
requirement, causes an increase in the intermediate demand, what gives rise to firm
profits and market entries. The relation between the cost effect and the forward
linkage determines the response of market concentration on the fixed cost.11 The
response of quality on changing fixed cost is reversed to firm number, as it becomes
apparent at the inequality signs. As shown in the previous section and apparent at
the quality policy (36), firm number and quality are negatively correlated due to
the price index.
Summarizing the outcomes of this section, we can make the following statements:
i) There is a unique and definite equilibrium, due to condition (42). ii) In contrast
to the single sector model, the market clearing function (41) can also be downward
sloping. In this context, a positive (negative) slope implies weak (strong) linkages
between manufacturing firms , so that inequality (43) qualifies to be a measure for
the classification of industries in terms of their sectoral coherence. iii) The equilib-
rium shows a different behavior with respect to changes in the exogenous variables,
as we have seen at the example of the fixed cost, F . An economic policy has to
regard the strength of the sectoral linkages, in order to meet the welfare maximizing
objectives. In the next section, we have a closer look on the impact of political in-
struments. Based on these results, we derive a framework for a research promoting
policy.
11In the original Dixit-Stiglitz model with vertical linkages, the condition (45b) is: ∂n∂F ≷ 0 ⇒
1 ≷
(
1
σ−1
)(
α
1−α
)
.
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4 Welfare Analysis
With respect to the allocation outcome in imperfect markets, we consider basic
economic policy instruments in this section. We depart from the view of a social
planner, that has the capacity to control central macroeconomic variables, more to
a practical point of view, where the state has limited possibilities in its instruments.
By doing this, we determine the welfare of the market allocation in order to com-
pare it with a situation, where the state disposes of the potential to control i) the
quality by minimum standards, ii) the research cost rate, and iii) the supply of R&D
activities.
Minimum Quality Standards
At first, we compare the effects of state-controlled quality standards with the un-
regulated equilibrium in terms of welfare losses. Assuming a given quality u¯, the
research investments become:
R =
r
γ
u¯γ.(46)
With this expression, the equilibrium output is:
x = σ
r
γ
u¯γ + σF.(47)
The firm number can be expressed with (47) and 1 + nR for the household income
as:
n =
µ
r
γ
u¯γ (σ − µ) + σF .(48)
From the research market equilibrium, we obtain 1 = n
γ
u¯γ. In combination with
equation (46), the research cost rate is given by:
r =
µu¯γ − γσF
u¯γ (σ − µ) .(49)
Substituting (49) into (48), yields equation (26), finally. For establishing a socially
optimal quality, we choose the welfare as a function of consumer utility. From
household optimization, we obtain the maximum utility as the real income of house-
holds:12
W = Y P−µ.(50)
12We neglect the term µµ (1− µ)1−µ.
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Without external intervention, social welfare is:
W ∗ = γ
µ
σ−1
[
σγ
σγ − µ
] [
µ
F
(
γ − 1
γ (σγ − µ)
)]µ(γ−1)
γ(σ−1)
.(51)
Having regard to quality regulation, the welfare function with respect to quality
becomes with equations (48) and (49):
W =
[
σu¯γ − γσF
u¯γ (σ − µ)
] (
γu¯1−γ
) µ
σ−1 .(52)
The limiting values of the hyperbolic welfare function are −∞ for u→ 0, and 0 for
u→∞. The unique maximum value, the target for a quality policy, is given by:
u¯ =
[(
γ
γ − 1
)
F
µ
(γ (σ − 1) + µ (γ − 1))
] 1
γ
.(53)
As easily to prove, the socially optimal product quality is always lower as in the
model without regulation. Figure 2 shows the welfare function for the parameter
constellation as in the previous illustration.
2 4 6 8 10
u
-0.2
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
W
u
*u
Figure 2: Quality and Welfare
The establishment of quality standards implies a welfare gain due to a reduction of
market concentration. The research investments and quality, respectively turn out
to be too high without regulation and, in consequence, the firm number too low,
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what is a result of market imperfections.13 These findings cause several problems for
real economic policy: i) if quality is too high, minimum standards fail the welfare
optimum; ii) in turn, maximum standards are not practicable what implies an in-
direct control via alternative political instruments; iii) variation in model premises
may change these outcomes. Assuming bounded rationality of consumers or infor-
mation asymmetry, for instance, could lead to systematic underestimation of quality
with the cause of a socially too low equilibrium. Setting quality standards means
a welfare maximum. In contrast, removing these deficiencies on the demand side
results (by public information, for example) in the unregulated quality only, that it
too high again. Beside these exceptions, we concentrate on the impact of an indirect
quality control by variations of the research cost rate.
Optimal Control of Research Costs
The state can control research cost in two different ways: via subsidization and tax-
ation as well as via a stately-owned or -regulated research sector. The argument for
a public intervention is not a failure on the research market itself, but rather in the
corresponding downstream sector. The choice of a research cost rate is linked with a
excess demand or supply, so that a case differentiation is required for the derivation
of the welfare function.
At first, we consider a cost rate above the equilibrium value, so that the demand
for R&D becomes the bottleneck. While household income, firm number and firm
size remain constant, the quality decreases due to the firm product policy. Although
research investments do not change, the employment in the R&D sector declines.
The welfare function with respect to the research cost rate can be expressed as:
W (r > r∗) =
[
σγ
σγ − µ
] [(
Fγ
γ − 1
)
µ (γ − 1)
F (σγ − µ)
] µ
σ−1
r
µ
γ(1−σ) .(54)
Because the terms in square brackets are positiv, the welfare decreases monotonically
with increasing cost rate, so that a scale up of r leads always to welfare losses.
If the cost rate is set below the equilibrium value, the demand for R&D services is
larger than the market capacity. In consequence, the quality becomes:
u =
[
γσF
µ− r (σ − µ)
] 1
γ
,(55)
The welfare function is now:
W (r < r∗) = (1 + r) γ
µ
γ(σ−1)
[
µ (1 + r)− rσ
σF
]µ(γ−1)
γ(σ−1)
.(56)
13This complies with the results of the seminal Dixit-Stiglitz model. See the introduction of
Brakman and Heijdra (2004), pages 19 et sqq., for instance.
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The limiting values of equation (56) are
(
µ
σF
)µ(γ−1)
γ(σ−1) for r → 0 and −∞ for r →∞.14
From (56), the welfare maximizing research cost rate is:
rmax =
µ [µ (γ − 1) + σ − γ]
σ [γ (σ − 1)− µ] + µ [γ − µ (γ − 1)] .(57)
Because of possible negative values of (57), the socially optimal research cost rate
is defined to be:
r¯ =
 rmax ∀ µ (γ − 1) > σ + γ0 ∀ µ (γ − 1) ≤ σ + γ.(58)
If we complete the welfare function for the whole range of r, we have to consider
both equations, (54) and (56). The graphs intersect at their lower and upper limit,
respectively: the non-regulated equilibrium r∗. All in all, we obtain a continuous but
non-differentiable welfare function. Figure 3 shows the socially optimal and unreg-
ulated research cost rate and the corresponding welfare values with the parameters
from above. It is a quite noteworthy fact that reducing quality to the optimum
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14
r
0.76
0.78
0.82
0.84
W
r *r
Figure 3: Research Cost and Welfare
level, is realizable by a reduction of the research cost rate, only – against intuition
and partial analytical results. All in all, this dependency can be traced back to the
occurring disequilibrium in the research market and the special characteristics of
14If
(
γ−1
γ
)
<
(
σ−1
µ
)
holds, the codomain of r is ]0, µσ−µ [ due to a negative root. The upper
limit is greater than the equilibrium cost rate without regulation, so that it is not a part of the
total (piecewise-defined) welfare function (54) and (56)
17
the Dixit-Stiglitz framework. Due to a research price below the equilibrium value,
the fixed supply of researchers is rationed to the increased demand of firms. The
research investments, R, become r/n. In consequence, these expenditures begin to
decrease. This reduces overall fixed costs, and hence, the average costs and break
even output, what causes an entry of new firms. The increased firm number and
lower research expenditures correspond with a decreasing quality, via equation (26).
Finally, we obtain a lower income and quality, but a higher firm number, compared
to the unregulated equilibrium. The decrease of household income is more than
compensated by the decrease of the price index.15
Supply of Research Activities
An alternative policy instrument consists in the control of the supply of R&D ser-
vices and scientific personnel, respectively. In reality, the range of activities varies
from a totally state-controlled research sector, an intensifying of (academic) edu-
cation in terms of quantity and quality, until the directed promotion, by funding
programs, for instance. As mentioned above, we neglect the financing of public
market intervention, but rather ask for the impact on allocation and welfare.
In section 2, we set the (price inelastic) supply of R&D equal to 1. Now we relax this
restriction and allow LR to be non-zero positive. In consequence, the equilibrium
research cost rate becomes:
r∗ =
µ
LR (σγ − µ) ,(59)
where the income remains constant at (20). The equilibrium quality can now be
expressed as:
u∗ =
[
FLRγ (σγ − µ)
µ (γ − 1)
] 1
γ
(60)
All in all, with increasing research supply, the firms are able to improve quality
without raising the research investments, so that market concentration as well as
firm size remain unchanged. If the firm number is constant at increasing quality,
the price index declines what increases the real income and welfare, finally. These
results imply that an increase in R&D supply leads to a better quality at unaffected
market concentration. Even though, an economic policy may increase the social
welfare, it fails to meet the welfare maximum.
15The derivative of the price index with respect to research cost is:
[(
γ−1
γ(1−σ)
)(
µ−−σ
µ−r(σ−µ)
)]
P <
0, where the denominator of the second fraction is always positive (see equation (54)).
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5 Numerical Application
In this section, we adopt the modeling results to real economic data and aim to
determine quality and research costs for selected European industries. The required
data are extracted from the EUROSTAT online data base and contain firm number,
turnover, and R&D expenditures (estimated) for 2003. Furthermore, we need the
corresponding substitution elasticities. Therefor we take the OLS-estimated values
of Hummels (1999), table 4. For the simulation, we need to make several assump-
tions:
• At first, we assume monopolistic competition for the respective industry. For
this case, we have to choose a sufficient degree of aggregation to avoid monop-
olistic or oligopolistic market structures and corresponding deviations from
the model of symmetric and independently acting (one product) firms. On
this note, we have to solve a trade-off, where a too high aggregation leads
to substitution elasticities that tend to be too low (smaller than 1). In this
simulation, we choose two-digit, in one case three-digit, industries.
• Implementing a general equilibrium model requires the consideration of multi-
ple industries. In this case, we choose a particular industry to analyze within
the manufacturing sector of the model and adopt the Walrasian sector to the
others. Hence, we assume a competitive market structure for the residual
economy.
• Through inter-sectoral mobility, we allow workers to move between sectors,
what may be critical, depending on type of work and industry.
• Because we simulate a closed economy, international trade relations are ex-
cluded. For the definition of an economic area with a high degree of domestic
trade, we choose the European Union (EU-25) and neglect its transcontinental
trade.
• In the regard to R&D, we assume a 1:1 relationship between research and
manufacturing sector and thus, neglect cross-sectoral research activities and
potential spill-over effects, just as we do not allow knowledge exchange between
firms.
• R&D investments are only employed for quality improvements, what includes
also the design of new (better) products. Research activities for cost reduc-
tion cannot be separated from the official statistic data and are inevitably
integrated in the R&D expenditures.
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• Finally, we rule out any public interventions and assume infinitely fast adjust-
ment processes, as well as an instantaneously (deterministic) effect of R&D on
quality.
Table 1 in the Appendix shows the simulation output for ten industries. For the
computation of the research elasticity, the relation (30) is used. The research cost
rate r is determined by equation (23), where the income share for manufactures,
µ, is the ratio of the respective industrial turnover and the GDP (2003) earned
in the EU-25. With the values for r and γ, the quality can be computed via equa-
tion (6). The marginal research costs come from the derivative of the same equation.
Results
All in all, we obtain only a rough estimation for the magnitudes of (calibrated) real
parameters. Having at first a look at the quality column, we obtain a widely spread
distribution. It is obvious that the quality correlates with the R&D intensity, where
research intensive branches show large values for quality, such as Pharmaceutics or
Computers, for instance.
The research elasticities indicate a strong divergence across the industries. The pa-
rameter tends to be high for branches with a low research intensity: Foods, Basic
Metals and Metal Manufactures vs. research intensive sectors with a high γ, Phar-
maceutics or Computers, for instance. In this context, we can observe a relatively
distinctive relation between substitution and research elasticity, where a low σ, what
means a high product differentiation, corresponds with a high γ. This indication
leads to the assumption that R&D investments are not used for quality improve-
ments only, but also for horizontal product differentiation.
Furthermore, we can observe large differences for the research cost rate, r: the high-
est values are in the Automotive and Pharmaceutical industry, in contrast to the
lowest value in the Metal Production and Metal Manufactures. An obvious reason
might be the lower demand for R&D services and personnel in the latter cases.
The column headed with ∂R/∂u shows the marginal research costs. As we can see,
the lowest correspond with the highest research intensities – concerning Pharmaceu-
tics, Computers and Medical Instruments etc., again.
Finally, the last column displays the welfare maximizing research cost rate, in accor-
dance with equations (57) and (58). As apparent, these values are very low, unless
0. Based on these results, an economic policy should decrease the cost rates down
to the particular values. This would imply an almost costless research, for reducing
quality to the welfare maximum level, a result that is arguable in the context of real
markets. This issue is discussed in the next section, beside a summary of the most
important outcomes of this paper and outlook on future research.
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6 Conclusions
In the course of this paper, several results confirmed the inverse relationship between
market concentration and research intensity in monopolistic competitive markets.
Equation (26), the zero-profit condition, shows a simple relation between firm num-
ber and quality, controlled by the exogenous research elasticity. Furthermore, this
paper showed the opposite dependence in (28), where the quality determines market
size and, thus, the firm number. The interaction of these two mechanisms generate
an equilibrium, where the firm number increases with an increasing research elastic-
ity, a higher degree of horizontal differentiation, and a lower production fixed cost.
In contrast, the quality increases with a lower research and a higher substitution
elasticity, and increasing fixed cost. In this context, we explored that, in equilib-
rium, the research intensity is determined by the research and substitution elasticity
only.
The implementation of vertical linkages leads to partially different results. Even
though we obtain a unique and globally stable equilibrium, and the relation (26) re-
mains unchanged, the outcomes of the comparative statics depend upon the strength
of the vertical linkages.
Political intervention is legitimated by a welfare loss due to imperfect markets. We
made out that the unregulated quality is above the social optimum, with the im-
plication that minimum quality standards do not have an impact on the allocation
outcome. An alternative instrument ist the price control of R&D services. Surpris-
ingly, the research cost rate must be reduced to meet the lower welfare maximizing
quality. In consequence, the firm number increases what reduces the price index at
constant household income, this, finally, implies a higher real income. An increase
in the R&D capacities leads to an increase in welfare but not to the corresponding
maximum. Ultimately, a social planner that aims to reach a certain level of (maxi-
mized) welfare, is supposed to combine research price instruments with an adapted
control of R&D supply.
The numerical application was conceived to quantify the magnitudes of the model
outcomes with the imputation of real data – considering the strong restriction of
the underlying assumptions. It may be pointed out that an advanced simulation
analysis using statistical data requires a detailed econometric foundation. However,
the results computed in this paper show a wide spreading in the quality across the
corresponding industries. Using the suggested approach, we consider aggregates of
industries and products. The results tend to be sufficient to compare differentiated
products within one sector, but less for comparison across industries, say cars and
computers, for instance. Based on the outcomes of this simulation, the welfare max-
imizing research cost rates would be zero, or almost zero. In consideration of these
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extreme results, we have to keep in mind that the policy aims to correct market
failures and not to promote technology development, as an example.
In the face of the underlying assumptions, one may complain two weaknesses of
this model: i) the industry-specific R&D sector, and ii) the absence of knowledge
spillover effects. Indeed, the model could describe a more realistic picture, if we
implement R&D that supplies several sectors, as it is observable in fields of funda-
mental research. And likewise, it may be interesting to consider internal R&D of
one firm that generates externalities for other firms in the corresponding industry.
In this context, the quality of a particular firm i is not only depending upon the
input of its own research input, ui
(
LRi
)
, but also upon the R&D efforts of the whole
sector: ui
(
LRi ,
∑n
j=1 L
R
j
)
. However, these issues will be part of future work.
Regarding international trade, for which this paper is intended to be a foundation of
implementing vertical product differentiation and R&D, the model opens the possi-
bility to analyze the impact of trade integration on quality and research investments,
and, in turn, the effects of R&D on spatial concentration and specialization. Based
on the extensions, we can model the implications of factor mobility (even in terms
of scientific labor force) and agglomeration by inter-sectoral linkages. Furthermore,
on the base of the policy instruments considered in this paper, we are able to deter-
mine the impact of quality standards as trade barrier, and to draw conclusions for
a location-oriented R&D policy.
7 Technical Appendix
Derivation of Cost Function and Intermediate Demand
The optimization problem on the lower stage is:
min.
n∑
i=1
pix
u
i s.t. I =
[
n∑
i=1
(ui)
1/σ (xi)
(σ−1)/σ
] σ
σ−1
(61)
The compensated demand for intermediates results from the first order conditions:
xu = u
(
P
p
)σ
.(62)
The upper stage of optimization is given by:
min. C = PI + wl +R s.t. F + ax = Zl1−αIα.(63)
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From the first order conditions we obtain:
l =
(
1− α
α
)
PI
w
.(64)
Substituting this expression into the general cost function, leads to:
I =
α (C −R)
P
.(65)
Equation (65) can now be inserted into the compensated intermediate demand (62),
from which the intermediate demand function (33) follows.
Total Differential of the Profit Function
Starting from the profit function:
pi = µY up1−σP σ−1 − awµY up−σP σ−1 − wF − r
γ
uγ,(66)
and substituting w + n r
γ
uγ for the income and p (nu)
1
1−σ for the price index, we
obtain:
pi =
µ
σn
+
µr
σγ
uγ − wF − r
γ
uγ,(67)
finally. Solving equation (11) for n and using the expression for Y as above, leads
to:
n =
(
µγ
σγ − µ
)
1
ruγ
.(68)
Equation (68) describes the dependency between n and u. If we set µ
σγ−µ for r, and
substitute (68) into the (67), totally differentiating the profit function yields the
expression (29).
In section 3, the total differential is:
dpi =
[
1
σ
]
dx+
( α(1− σ) (1− α)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(
µ− (γσ − α (γσ − 1))
γσ + γα (1− σ)− µ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
FP
 duu .(69)
As in the model without linkages, profits and firm number respond positively on
demand and quality. For a further detailed analysis of the disaggregated model, see
Kranich (2006).
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